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ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 




Setting priorities objectively is difficult at EPA because of 
numerous explicit statutory prescriptions, political and public 
pressures, internal bureaucratic tendencies, and deficiencies 
in data and analytical methods. To bring more rationality to 
this process, EPA has recently completed a study comparing 
the magnitudes of the major environmental problems the 
agency might address. This paper describes the methods and 
findings of this study, and how it can be used at EPA to improve 
overall protection of the environment.
INTRODUCTION
I have been invited in this paper to discuss two particular 
aspects of environmental policy in the United States: planning 
for the future, and enforcement of environmental require­
ments. I have chosen to cover only one of these topics— plan­
ning— rather than both of them.
I regard effective planning as critical to the mission of the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA is pro­
vided with a limited staff and budget to perform its function. 
EPA can also require private industry to spend some limited 
amount of money for environmental purposes. The challenge 
of planning is to determine how to spend these limited re­
sources for greatest effect. EPA must decide which environ­
mental problems to devote attention to, and how much effort to 
give to each.
* Director, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Washington, D.C.
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Once the critical planning decisions are made about 
which problems to address, EPA then turns to a next set of de­
cisions about how to address each problem on the agenda. 
Whereas the strategic planning decisions must be made by the 
highest officials in the agency, who have an overview of all the 
potential areas of agency concern, the more tactical decisions 
about what to do for an individual problem area can be made 
by the manager of that program area. The program manager 
can decide what combination of steps— establishing new regu­
latory requirements, implementing requirements, or enforc­
ing against companies or others not complying with them— is 
most appropriate for his program. Decisions about enforce­
ment and other steps in implementing a program are made 
subsequent to the planning decisions and can be delegated.
The issue I most want to discuss is how to go about setting 
the agenda for an environmental agency. I suspect that the U.S. 
experience in planning and priority-setting may have much 
that is relevant for China. You, like us, must set priorities by 
carefully balancing the requirements of laws, the wishes of the 
public, and the views of technical experts in the environmental 
agency. On enforcement issues we may not have so much to 
learn from each other. In our system, enforcement policy is 
very dependent on the peculiarities of our laws governing each 
program area. I suspect that our laws and the resulting meth­
ods that are available for enforcement are very different from 
yours.
PRIORITY-SETTING AT EPA
When the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
was established in 1970, the nation’s most pressing environ­
mental problems were obvious: soot and smoke from cars and 
smokestacks, and the raw sewage and chemicals from munici­
pal and industrial wastewater.
Since 1970 the nation has done much to abate the most 
visible forms of pollution, but there is still much unfinished 
business. Moreover, new problems have also been "discovered" 
or have risen in importance, such as indoor radon, global cli­
matic change from the buildup of carbon dioxide in the at­
mosphere, acid precipitation and hazardous waste. Many of 
these new problems are difficult to evaluate, as they involve 
slow, cumulative changes with very serious possible ultimate 
effects, amidst considerable scientific uncertainty. Many 
involve toxic chemicals that can cause cancer or birth defects 
at levels of exposure that are hard to detect. And many involve 
persistent contam inants that can move from  one 
environmental medium to another, causing further damage 
even after controls have been applied for one medium.
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The complexity and gravity of these issues make it partic­
ularly important that EPA apply its finite resources where 
they w ill have the greatest effect. Choosing which 
environmental programs to emphasize should be viewed as an 
attempt to maximize health and ecological benefits from the 
public and private resources the EPA can command. In theory, 
the environmental agency should analyze its set of investment 
opportunities and select projects proceeding down an ordered 
list until a sufficient number of projects have been chosen to 
exhaust the agency's budget.
Needless to say, priority-setting at EPA does not look 
much like this theoretical model. A  wide variety of factors 
combine to make such priority-setting difficult at EPA.
One major difficulty stems from the multiple statutory 
goals governing the agency. EPA adminsters nine major 
statutes. They contain a multitude of goals and prescriptions. 
In recent legislation the goals have become extremely specific, 
detailing what EPA is to do by when, and what will happen if 
EPA does not do so. Occasionally, the goals conflict as when a 
statute governing one environmental medium mandates con­
trols that transfer pollution to another medium.
Achieving all of the statutory mandates is impossible 
with the available resources. No escape is provided for— there is 
no recognition that some of the goals are unlikely to be 
achieved, and there is no guidance as to how to choose among 
goals when all of them can not be met. EPA is held accountable 
for each missed goal, and an argument that the goal was not 
achieved because the agency was working on something of 
higher priority is not regarded as a valid excuse. In recent 
years, in fact, the Congress seems to have distrusted EPA’s per­
formance in setting priorities sufficiently so as to limit it 
drastically.
This lack of appreciation in environmental statutes for 
the need to set priorities is also mirrored by the diverse public 
and political pressures brought to bear on the agency. Each is 
aimed at a particular program— "Clean up the abandoned haz­
ardous waste site in my neighborhood quickly", or "My com­
pany can’t afford to comply with your proposed air pollution 
control regulations", for example. Petitioners who want such 
actions from EPA are not satisfied when EPA does not do what 
they want because "other things are higher priority". The 
homeowner worried about a nearby hazardous waste site is not 
impressed when EPA responds that other sites scoring higher 
on a hazard Ranking System will be cleaned up first. The in­
dustrial plant manager is not satisfied when told that the pro­
posed regulation abates health effects at an acceptable cost per 
case avoided. There is little external appreciation for EPA's
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need, however, it is to be done, to set priorities across pro­
grams.
Internal pressures also make rational priority-setting 
difficult. As in all typical bureaucracies, long-established pro­
grams build an internal constituency of employees as well as 
an external one. And, in an area such as environmental 
protection with a substantial technical component, existing 
programs will build a critical knowledge base that can be used 
to justify spending more on them: monitoring data, engineer­
ing data on relevant control technologies, toxicological data 
on relevant pollutants, etc. By contrast, a new program to deal 
with an emerging environmental problem will have difficulty 
making its case due to uncertainty and lack of good data.
Even if the bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles to ra­
tional priority-setting did not exist, environmental priority­
setting would still be extremely difficult methodologically. A  
critical element in setting priorities is being able accurately to 
predict and then compare the likely results of alternative ac­
tions. Impediments to doing this well in the environmental 
field include:
1. A  severe lack of knowledge about environmental 
processes. There are thousands of potentially toxic chemicals 
in commerce, and we have a toxicological understanding of 
only several hundred. We know virtually nothing about their 
synergistic or antagonistic effects. We know little about com­
plex chemical transformations involving pollutants in the 
atmosphere or in groundwater. We know little about the reac­
tions of entire ecosystems, as opposed to single species, to 
environmental pollution. Our data bases on emissions, ambi­
ent levels, exposure and uptake of pollutants are quite limited.
2. Methodological difficulties in specifying what envi­
ronmental "results" are. We can measure quantities such as 
emissions or ambient concentrations, but these are not the ul­
timate terms in which environmental changes should be eval­
uated. We pursue environmental improvements because we 
care fundamentally about human health, ecological quality 
and economic values. In the area of economic values, there is 
consensus over measuring results in dollar terms— in dollar 
costs of compliance and in dollar losses stemming from envi­
ronmental damages. But in the other two areas— human health 
and ecological quality—there is no agreement on the ultimate 
units we care about. Do we care more about a low risk of birth 
defects in future generations, or about a higher incidence of 
gastroenteritis among the current population? Do we care 
more about episodic fish kills from pollution in rivers, or 
about reproductive difficulties in birds exposed to certain pes­
ticides? We don't know the answers to these questions. Even if
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we could assess the risks inherent in these events accurately, 
we still would not know how to value them.
3. Evaluation of environmental results is further com­
plicated when we try to compare across fundamental values. 
We cannot specify exactly what we mean by ecological quality, 
nor how we should trade it off against human health or eco­
nomic values. It is extremely difficult, often impossible, to find 
a common denominator with which to compare disparate en­
vironmental programs.
4. Finally, projecting the results of environmental pro­
grams is difficult because EPA does not ultimately implement 
them. Typically, the private sector and state and local govern­
ments do. In assessing programs, EPA must judge the likely 
slippage between its regulatory proclamations and actions by 
other governments and the private sector.
In sum, numerous factors combine to make rational pri­
ority-setting very difficult at EPA. Statutory mandates and 
public, political, and bureaucratic pressures discourage it. 
Even absent these influences, it is difficult to manage well 
without clear values and good information.
In most respects, EPA has fallen prey to these difficulties 
in priority-setting. Perhaps like many other agencies, EPA's 
procedures for priority-setting:
• Are driven largely by statues. EPA spends much of its 
effort in programming resources to meet goals established by 
Congress. In general it is appropriate for the Congress to set 
EPA's agenda. But the agency has several important advan­
tages relative to the Congress that it should contribute to the 
process of setting environmental priorities: greater technical 
expertise, and greater appreciation of the opportunities and 
difficulties in program implementation. Based on this knowl­
edge EPA should, but does not, assert more authority in prior­
ity-setting. EPA should choose explicitly among competing 
congressional goals when this is authorized by statute or ne­
cessitated by budget constraints. EPA should seek actively to 
have Congress change environmental statutes where neces­
sary. Instead, though, EPA seems to look harder for more guid­
ance from the Congress. EPA now commonly researches the 
legislative history of statutes to divine "Congressional intent", 
and tests in advance the reaction of key congressional person­
nel to possible agency regulatory actions.
• Are incremental. Priority-setting processes at EPA 
focus on marginal decisions rather than on base programs. A  
typical issue is whether a program should be given a small in­
crease in resources, stay the same or suffer a small cut. 
Marginal projects comprising each increment will be evalu­
ated, but the much larger base program is not examined.
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• Seldom involve explicit cross-program comparisons. 
EPA’s priorities tend to be an aggregation of within-program 
decisions. It is rare that anyone pits one program against an­
other and asks which offers the best return for invested re­
sources.
• Make insufficient use of technical expertise. EPA has 
substantial in-house technical expertise that is brought to bear 
on specific program issues such as individual regulations. But 
EPA's experts have typically not been asked for judgments be­
yond those within the province of their technical specialty, be 
it toxicology, engineering, or ecology. These experts are asked 
to play little role in priority-setting, where judgments and 
opinions become critical in filling the gaps between areas of 
technical knowledge.
In recent years some improvements have occurred in 
EPA’s priority-setting. Perhaps most important are advances 
in risk assessment techniques for human health impacts of 
environmental pollutants. For cancer impacts in particular, 
there is now a common denominator for comparing different 
programs, and quantitative procedures for estimating this 
common denominator. These methods are generally used in 
priority-setting at the margin, in helping to decide which po­
tential new regulation to adopt and which to reject. Using risk 
assessment and other techniques, EPA will typically calculate 
the cost per cancer case avoided for each new proposed regula­
tion. Applying a similar cost-effectiveness cut-off level across 
all regulations provides some consistency to EPA decision­
making at the margin in the human health area. (Some ob­
servers argue also, though, that EPA's increasing ability to an­
alyze human health effects quantitatively has caused the 
agency to pay too little attention to non-quantifiable concerns 
such as ecological quality.)
A lso im portant are recent EPA emphases on 
"environmental results" and on strategic planning. The agency 
has been revamping its internal management systems to en­
courage managers to pursue ultimate environmental results 
(health or ecological or economic improvements) rather than 
intermediate administrative goals (e.g., issuing permits, con­
ducting inspections, taking enforcement actions). For key pro­
gram areas, the agency has also been improving its process for 
strategic planning to achieve environmental results, and inte­
grating the results of the strategic planning more forcefully 
into the processes for budgeting and setting the agency's 
regulatory agenda.
A  final important step in improving EPA’s ability to set 
priorities effectively has been a study entitled "Unfinished 
Business: A  Comparative Assessment of Environmental Prob­
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lems" (CAEP).* The remainder of this paper will focus on the 
CAEP.
METHODOLOGY OF THE COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
PROJECT
The CAEP was an ambitious year-long project to deter­
mine the comparative magnitude of the various environmen­
tal problems that EPA might address. We aimed to develop a 
broad picture of environmental problems in terms of the rela­
tive risks to human health and the environment posed by each. 
Which are the largest problems EPA might tackle; which are 
smaller? In a world of limited resources, we thought this pro­
file of relative risks would be a good starting point for agency 
priority-setting. Other things being equal, EPA should devote 
more effort to solving larger problems.
This sort of study was new for EPA. The agency has a great 
deal of experience in assessing risks at stake in particular reg­
ulatory approaches to controlling a single pollutant from a 
single type of source. EPA also has some experience in pro­
gram-wide risk assessment. EPA has, for example, completed a 
study of the health risks from hazardous air pollutants, devel­
oping several approaches for estimating the nationwide inci­
dence of cancer from these pollutants.** But a study of the scope 
of the CAEP, covering multiple sorts of risks and all environ­
mental programs, was novel. In conducting the project, we or­
ganized and limited our work in four important ways.
First, we divided the universe of environmental problems 
into 31 pieces. Each of the pieces represents an environmental 
problem area defined along lines corresponding generally with 
existing programs or statutes. For example, some of our 31 
problem areas are: criteria air pollutants, hazardous air pollu­
tants, contaminants in drinking water, abandoned hazardous 
waste (e.g., Superfund) sites, pesticide residues on food, and 
worker exposures to toxic chemicals. Other ways of slicing the 
pie were possible; for example by pollutant, by route of expo­
sure, by source category or by environmental medium. We 
thought it most important to define our units in terms corre­
sponding roughly to program priority decisions.
Second, we considered four different types of risk for each 
problem area: cancer risks, non-cancer health risks< ecologi­
cal effects, and welfare effects (visibility impairment, materi
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis, Unfinished 
Business: A  Comparative Assessm ent o j  Environmental Problems, 
Washington, D.C., Feburaiy, 1987.
** U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Magnitude and Nature o f the Air 
Toxics Problem in the United States, Washington, D.C., September, 1984.
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als damage, etc.). Each type of risk was analyzed separately. 
There were no decisions that one type was more important 
than another, and we made no attempt to "add" risks for a 
problem area across the four risk types.
Third, in view of the already massive scope of the project, 
we decided to limit it by not considering:
• the economic or technical controllability of the 
risks;
• the qualitative aspects of the risks that people find 
important, such as the degree to which the risks are voluntary, 
familiar, or equitable;
• the benefits to society of the activities that cause the 
risks; and
• the statutory and public mandate (or lack thereof) for 
EPA to deal with the risks.
These decisions about where to limit the scope of the study and 
where not to were carefully considered. In order to provide a 
broad guide to EPA priority-setting, we thought it critical to 
include within the study all issue areas that EPA might 
potentially address, and all types of risk that EPA generally 
seeks to abate. The study scope thus includes some areas that 
are primarily the province of other agencies (e.g., risks from 
exposure to consumer products addressed by the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission) and some areas for which EPA 
has no clear statutory authority (e.g., indoor air pollution). On 
the other hand, the decision to limit the project scope by not 
considering the controllability of the risks both made the 
project more manageable and, by making the results fall short 
of translating directly into recommended agency priorities, 
made the project less threatening to participants.
Finally, because the intent of the project was to indentify 
areas of unfinished business for EPA, we assessed risks as they 
exist now—given the levels of controls that are currently in 
place. We did not aim to assess risks that have been abated by 
EPA's programs or that will be abated by EPA’s programs when 
full compliance with current regulatory requirements is 
achieved. This decision again had the effect of stopping the 
study results short of directly guiding agency priorities. By 
looking at existing or residual risks we gained an idea of what 
more the agency could aim to accomplish with additional ef­
forts in various program areas, but we did not examine what 
would be lost if the agency reduced its efforts in these areas. To 
the extent that priority-setting involves both investments in 
some areas and disinvestments in others, the results of the 
CAEP directly inform only the investment decision portion of 
the process.
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The method we used to compare environmental problem 
areas can best be described as systematically generating in­
formed judgments among agency experts. About 75 career 
managers and experts representing all EPA programs partici­
pated in four work groups (one for each of the four types of risk) 
over a period of about nine months. The participants assem­
bled and analyzed masses of existing data on pollutants, expo­
sures and effects, but ultimately had to fill substantial gaps in 
available data by using their collective judgment. In this sense, 
the project represents expert opinion rather than objective and 
quantitative analysis.
In retrospect, the project involved more judgment and less 
objective analysis than was expected. The quantity and quality 
of available information were worse than was hoped; in effect 
the agency knows in a precise way much less about environ­
mental problems than it should. An illustrative example of the 
interplay between data and judgment occurred when the health 
work groups tried to assess risks associated with the hazardous 
air pollutant problem area. Reasonably good data exists on 
emissions, exposures, and effects for some 30 hazardous air 
pollutants. Health risks from these chemicals could be as­
sessed objectively as moderately high in comparison to other 
environmental problems. However, there are hundreds or even 
thousands of potential additional chemicals that could be 
classified as hazardous air pollutants, for which very limited 
or no data exist. If the roughly 30 well-understood chemicals 
constitute a moderately high health risk, how large is the en­
tire hazardous air pollutant problem when the additional 
chemicals are considered also? Are the 30 chemicals only the 
tip of the hazardous air pollutant iceberg? Or are the 30 known 
chemicals far worse than the others (perhaps because EPA has 
chosen to generate data first on the worst of all the hazardous 
air pollutants)? The work groups had to use their judgment, in­
formed by widely scattered data, to answer questions like this 
in assessing the risks due to the entire hazardous air pollutant 
problem.
In addition to data deficiencies, the work group also had 
to contend with methodological difficulties. Standard assess­
ment methods existed for cancer health effects and for welfare 
effects, but new approaches had to be improvised for ecological 
risks and non-cancer health effects. Difficult questions of 
ground rules had to be resolved (e.g., should risks that occur far 
in the future be discounted relative to those occurring today?). 
Overlaps and inconsistencies were discovered in the list of 31 
problem areas (e.g., should leachate from a hazardous waste 
site that contaminates groundwater used for drinking be
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classed as a hazardous waste problem, a drinking water prob­
lem, or both?).
Despite the difficulties, participants in the project ex­
pressed confidence in their final relative rankings. They be­
lieve that there really are substantial differences in risk across 
major environmental problem areas, and that the relative 
rankings reflect the gist of these differences. Although the 
leaps of judgments and manipulation of limited data were ini­
tially very disturbing for many of the scientists on the work 
groups, by the end of the process the participants felt satisfied 
with the process they had created to rank the problem areas 
and with the results of the process.
FINDINGS OF THE COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT PROJECT
The major findings of the project are rankings of the 31 
problem areas for each of four types of risk. The rankings are 
based on risks existing today, assuming that current controls 
stay in place. We found the following:
• No problems rank relatively high in all four types of 
risk, or relatively low in all four. Whether an environmental 
problem appears large or not depends critically on the type of 
adverse effect with which one is concerned.
• Problems that rank relatively high in three of four 
risk types, or at least medium in all four include: criteria air 
pollutants; stratospheric ozone depletion; pesticide residues on 
food; and other pesticide risks (runoff and air deposition of 
pesticides).
• Problems that rank relatively high in cancer and 
non-cancer health risks but low in ecological and welfare risks 
include: hazardous air pollutants; indoor radon; indoor air 
pollution other than radon; pesticide application; exposure to 
consumer products; and worker exposures to chemicals.
• Problems that rank relatively high in ecological and 
welfare risks, but low in both health risks include: global 
warming; point and non-point sources of surface water pollu­
tion; and physical alteration of aquatic habitats (including es­
tuaries and wetlands) and mining.
• Areas related to groundwater consistently rank 
medium or low. These include active hazardous waste (RCRA) 
sites, inactive hazardous waste (Superfund) sites, municipal 
and industrial non-hazardous waste sites, releases from stor­
age tanks, and other groundwater contamination.
The rankings by risk do not correspond very well with 
EPA’s current program priorities. Areas of relatively high risk 
but low EPA effort include: indoor radon; indoor air pollution; 
stratospheric ozone depletion; global warming; pesticides 
risks; accidental releases of toxics; consumer projects; and
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worker exposures. Areas of high EPA effort but relatively 
medium or low risks include: RCRA sites; Superfund; under­
ground storage tanks; and municipal non-hazardous waste 
sites.
This divergence between what we found in terms of rela­
tive risks and EPA’s priorities is not necessarily inappropri­
ate. Some problems appear to pose relatively low risks pre­
cisely because of high levels of program effort that have been 
devoted to controlling them, for example surface water pollu­
tion by industry and municipalities. These high levels of 
attention may remain necessary in order to hold risks to cur­
rent levels. In other areas, notably those relating to hazardous 
or solid waste, current risks appear low even without large his­
torical amounts of effort having been devoted to their control.
Overall, EPA’s priorities appear more closely aligned with 
public opinion than with our estimated risks. Recent national 
polling data rank areas of concern about environmental issues 
as follows:
• High: chemical waste disposal, water pollution, 
chemical plant accidents, and air pollution;
• Medium: oil spills, worker exposure, pesticides, and 
drinking water;
• Low: indoor air pollution, consumer products, radia­
tion (except nuclear power), and global warming.
A  final item resulting from the project is the agenda it has 
given EPA for improving data and methods for performing en­
vironmental risk assessments. We have found it impossible to 
perform this project in a quantitatively rigorous fashion. The 
best information we have is on the environmental causes of 
cancer, but it is weak even here. There is a general lack of in­
formation on and attention to welfare and ecological effects. 
Members of both the ecological and the welfare work groups 
felt that EPA has paid too little attention to these sorts of con­
cerns relative to human health. Exposure data are often poor 
in all four areas, even in problem areas where major regula­
tory efforts are under way. No generally accepted methods exist 
for assessing ecological or non-cancer health effects.
THE IMPACT OF THE STUDY AND THE NEXT STEPS
The CAEP was designed to avoid several of the shortcom­
ings that typify priority-setting at EPA:
• The CRP aimed explicity to compare environmental 
problem areas with each other. Problems were not addressed in 
isolation. Methods were developed and information was ob­
tained specifically to allow relative comparisons of the differ­
ent problem areas.
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• The analysis was not limited to increments or mar­
gins. Entire problem areas were compared with each other.
• The analysis focused on the ultimate impacts of en­
vironmental problems. Where accepted methods of analysis 
did not already exist, new methods were developed that allowed 
participants to focus on these ultimate rather than intermedi­
ate impacts.
• The analysis was not constrained by statutory, pub­
lic, or political pressure. It aimed objectively to assess risks, 
independently of whether or how those risks ought to be dealt 
with. It assessed a broad set of problem areas, including several 
outside of EPA’s direct statutory mandates.
• The analysis made maximum use of the expertise and 
information within the agency. The participants were EPA's 
best and brightest.
But the project still falls well short of what is needed in 
theory for a full guide to priority-setting. The CAEP assessed 
only risks and not potential control actions. Allocation of re­
sources among programs should depend on both the possibili­
ties for risk reduction and the costs of achieving it in each 
area. Absent an investigation of controllability, we cannot be 
certain that more agency attention to high risk program areas 
would represent an improvement over the current agency allo­
cation of resources.
Despite not having done an explicit analysis of controlla­
bility, we strongly suspect that resource reallocation is desir­
able toward program areas identified in the CAEP as high 
risk/low EPA effort. This depends on two propositions. First, 
we suspect that spending in each program area shows a pattern 
of declining marginal product; that the first actions under­
taken in a program area are the most cost-effective and subse­
quent actions are progressively less so. Secondly, we suspect 
that the initial program actions in any high risk program area 
are in an absolute sense extremely cost-effective, whether or 
not the area is amenable to traditional regulatory controls. At 
a minimum, research and development, public education, and 
legislative development are probably very profitable initial 
steps. In sum, although we have not done the supporting 
analysis, we felt that additional (or perhaps even initial) 
spending in high risk/low effort areas is likely to be more 
worthwhile than additional spending in low risk/high effort 
program areas.
Finally, in a practical sense the CAEP does not provide a 
full guide to priority-setting. Priorities in an administrative 
agency cannot depend solely on the agency's expert judgment of 
the cost and benefits of different investment opportunities.
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Statutory mandates, public perceptions and political pressures 
are also critical influences.
The major hope for the study outside of EPA was that it 
would be viewed as a credible attempt to enhance environmen­
tal priority-setting. The specific findings were of concern, but 
equally important was to prompt a broader and better in­
formed debate (especially in the political arena) about envi­
ronmental priorities. And, we hoped that the debate would fo­
cus heavily on risks and opportunities to reduce risks in dif­
ferent environmental areas.
We believe the process followed by the EPA in its CAEP 
provides a useful model for other government agencies also. It 
is desirable for all government agencies to focus their re­
sources efficiently on achieving their fundamental missions. 
Objective analysis to compare the magnitudes of the problems 
an agency might deal with, public debate of these findings, and 
consequent reordering of priorities are important steps toward 
this goal.
